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THOMAS E. JANOSKI 
University of Kentucky 
 
Introduction 
In the halls of American policy making, neo-classical economists have long had 
the politician’s ear, and this has intensified with the rise of neo-liberalism as a 
political movement.  Marion Fourcade and colleagues even title a recent paper 
“The Superiority of Economists”.2 And neo-liberalism seeks to replace many state 
functions with free market solutions such as privatizing the post office and 
chartering the public schools. Economists’ arguments about markets vary in three 
ways: (a) positive claims that free markets are more efficient and rational, (b) 
normative claims that free markets should be more rational or efficient but fail to 
be so due to interest groups and politics, or irrational consumers or producers, and 
(c) interference claims that the state prevents free markets.3 The public tends to 
accept these arguments in boom times, but in crisis these arguments of perfect 
markets (or imperfect markets but it is the best that we can do) have encountered 
a crescendo of criticism. Scholars in anthropology, sociology, geography and 
even parts of psychology have argued against the efficiency, rationality and 
uncritical use of market theory. This paper will consider five such arguments 
against the exaggerations and misconceptions of free markets, while still 
maintaining that markets can be useful if they are regulated and/or altered in a 
number of ways. These challenges are not so much normative arguments that 
markets should behave in different ways. Rather they are arguments that markets 
actually do operate in a variety of ways and that we should recognize the reality 
of markets (i.e., their good and bad sides) and then more accurately attempt to 
alter or control that reality.  
This article will first review why many social scientists are dissatisfied 
                                                            
1 The author thanks the participants of the “Market Failures, Famines and Crisises” Seminar 
sponsored by the Committee on Social Theory in the Spring of 2014, especially the other three 
faculty participants – David Freshwater from Agricultural Economics, David Hamilton from 
History, and Arnold Farr from Philosophy. He also thanks the other participants especially Grace 
Cale and Lydia Shanklin Roll, and Greta Krippner of the University of Michigan for her visit to 
the class to explain her economic sociological theories of market failure. 
2 Marion Fourcade, Etienne Ollion, and Yann Algan, "The Superiority of Economists," Maxpo 
Discussion Paper 14, no. 3 (2014). 
3 While there are institutional and Marxist economists, my reference to economists reflects the 
mainstream and dominant view of neo-classical economics in the US.  
Milton Friedman, Free to Choose (New York: Mariner Books, 1990). 
Friedrich August Hayek, The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents: The Definitive Edition (New 
York: Routledge, 2014). 
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with an overreliance on markets, and a conceptualization of markets being 
efficient, fair and rational. This will focus especially on marginal utility – the 
dominant economic mechanism when it comes to explaining efficient and rational 
markets. The challenge to markets is then widened in a number of ways to include 
crucial explanations as to why and how markets get constructed, especially their 
mechanisms. It presents five types of arguments critical of markets: (1) the 
Marxian approach to markets and then later in the paper, their view of crises 
along with the Hyman Minsky approach of increasing cyclical pressure to take 
risks, (2) the rise of Karl Polanyi’s view that markets are fragile and that they 
need to be embedded in society and the state; (3) a coalition of organizational 
scholars including Neil Fligstein see organizations of various types as creating a 
‘conception of control’ whereby the market is shaped by their elite interests; (4) a 
more complex decision-making approach starting with Max Weber’s view of 
social action being based on rationalities, traditions and emotions, which is then 
combined with Edward Fischer’s cultural approach to prices, quality, and the 
environment; and (5) a macro-application of  social exchange theory to bargaining 
power in the market. But one caveat must be stated at the beginning. This paper 
does not provide evidence on the workability of these five approaches, but rather 
sets the scope and range of each of these market critiques. In essence, each theory 
questions either rationality or efficiency, and a number of the theories question 
the outright goals of economic market theories in terms of fairness and economic 
growth.  
Dissatisfaction with an Overemphasis of the Virtues of Markets: 
Neo-classical economics developed primarily out of the micro-economic 
marginalist school developed by Alfred Marshall (1979), Léon Walras (1984), 
Vilfredo Pareto (1906), Arthur Pigou (1920), and Carl Menger (1950) around the 
turn of the 19th into the 20th century.4 Marginal utility becomes the driving force 
of investment and wages as owners pay wages only in proportion to the utility that 
is added to their production, and investment is only made when marginal utility is 
of a high order. Marginalist economics is highly amenable to mathematical 
specification and it propelled economics as a field into micro- or firm-level focus 
on supply and demand. The moral philosophy approach of Adam Smith is 
somewhat of an embarrassment to these marginalists.5 Smith only used ‘the 
                                                            
4 Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics (London: MacMillan Press, 2004). 
Leon Walras, Elements of Pure Economics. 4th ed. (Philadelphia, PA: Orion Editions, 1984). 
Vilfredo Pareto, Manual of Political Economy (London: Macmillan, 1927). 
Arthur Cecil Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (Palgrave Macmillan, 1920). 
Carl Menger, Principles of Economics, 1950. 
5 Matthew Watson, Foundations of International Political Economy (New York: Palgrave-
MacMillan, 2005). 
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invisible hand’ metaphor twice in The Wealth of Nations,6 and proposed more of 
a symbolic interactionist view with empathy and concern for others as how 
markets and firms are tamed in the economic field.7 Smith even contradicts the 
theory of comparative advantage with ‘absolute advantage.’ But marginalist 
economics takes the little-used metaphor of the invisible hand and drops much of 
the rest of Smith. Marginalism was so successful that it made macro-economics 
passé. Keynesian economics in the 1930s was a reinvigoration of macro-
economics, and it largely opposed to the marginalists’ overlooking phenomena at 
the institutional, nation-state and even global level.8 But market rationality and 
efficiency largely rest on the principles developed by accentuating the importance 
of firms and consumers following the dictates of rationality in pursuit of 
“marginal utility.”  
There are three main issues that social scientists contest about a 
neoclassical view of markets: inequality, instability, and residualization or 
overreach.9 First, many social scientists view the market as causing inequality and 
that it requires major efforts to make the economy and society anywhere near 
being legitimate or just. This is a major position of citizenship theory from T. H. 
Marshall to Bryan Turner.10 The market makes inequality and the social welfare 
state mitigates this by creating or restoring equality.11 The market and citizenship, 
especially social rights and the welfare state, are almost in a dialectical 
relationship in maintaining somewhat of a socially just society. It’s almost a yin 
and yang of destructive inequality and restorative equality. When encountering 
fairness and inequality, the marginalists have a soft and a hard answer. The soft 
argument sees fairness as coming in terms of everyone getting their best bargain 
in the market, and that the market then equilibrates to satisfy everyone’s’ needs. 
This theory peaked in the 1990s up until 2008 in the form of the efficient market 
hypothesis. While there were strong and weak forms of this theory, its strong 
version stated that financial markets reflect a vast amount of public and even 
insider data, and thus, markets accurately reflect the equilibrium prices of firm 
                                                            
6 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. Edwin  
Cannan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1776), 744. 
7 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (New York: Penguin, 2010). 
8 For an extended critique, see: Matthew Watson, Foundations of International Political Economy, 
2005. 
9 Tony Lawson in Reorienting Economics (2003:3) sees these weaknesses as: (1) domination by a 
mathematical-deductivist modeling that ignores empirical reality, (2) a mainstream project that is 
in disarray, (3) models being applied to a reality that does not conform, and (4) an approach that 
keeps economics from realizing its potential. These points, of course, can be debated. 
10 Thomas H. Marshall, "Class, Citizenship and Social Development" (1964). 
Bryan Turner, Bryan, Citizenship and Capitalism (London: Allen-Unwin, 1986). 
11 Thomas Janoski, Citizenship and Civil Society: A Framework of Rights and Obligations in 
Liberal, Traditional, and Social Democratic Regimes (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998). 
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stock and to a certain degree the strategies that they are following. Eugene Fama 
(1965, 1970) was most associated with this theory and received a Nobel Prize for 
his theory.12 However, this concept of fairness does not do well in the face of 
poverty and underdevelopment, and it looked especially bad in the aftermath of 
the 2008 Great Recession. The hard argument indicates that human beings own 
property and they profit from their expert and skillful use of that property. If 
others do not have the skills or industriousness of the wealthy, then it is their own 
fault. This answer is not satisfactory to critics, but it has the merit of being more 
in accord with empirical results (i.e., it does not pretend to be equitable). In effect, 
this comes down to equality of opportunity without regard to the results. 
Second, the economics term ‘externality’ describes a great deal of what 
other social sciences disciplines (anthropology, geography, sociology and political 
science) are about. Theorists often refer to this as a “residual category” or a large 
amount social action that a theory claims no expertise over. Obviously, these 
other social sciences view this residualization of society as a huge gap in 
economic theories, especially when those theories are claimed to hold the key to 
how life and government should be conducted. Third, markets are prone to cycles, 
shocks, recessions and depressions. If the market is so efficient, why do these 
types of events occur? But markets are often not efficient and lead to large 
amounts of waste both human and environmental. Economists often refer to these 
issues as ‘adjustments,’ but they are often quite devastating to society. I will have 
more to say on this later. 
One distraction should be mentioned concerning economic debates. In the 
1930s, John Maynard Keynes developed what became known as Keynesian 
economics in The General Theory of Employment and Money.13 In economic 
discourse over the last 80 years, economists have had intensely divisive debates 
over Keynesian versus monetary economic solutions most often embodied by 
Milton Friedman and now, the neo-liberals and supply-side economists.14 Keynes 
said that the government should intervene in the economy with strong counter-
cyclical spending patterns in order to avert a recession or depression, and he is 
most currently represented by Paul Krugman.15 Many economists credit US, 
                                                            
12 Oddly enough, Fama’s Nobel Prize came in 2013 after his theories suffered from harsh criticism 
from the 2008 Great Recession.  
Eugene Fama, "The Behavior of Stock Market Prices," Journal of Business 38 (1965): 34-105. 
——— "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work," Journal of Finance 
25, no. 2 (1970): 383-417. 
13 John Maynard Keynes, General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (London: 
Prometheus Books, 1936). 
14 Milton Friedman, Free to Choose (New York: Mariner Books, 1990). 
15 John Maynard Keynes, General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (London: 
Prometheus Books, 1936). 
Paul Krugman, End This Depression Now! (New York: WW Norton & Company, 2012). 
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German and Swedish counter-cyclical spending during the depression as a major 
force to end that crisis. However, Keynes is more or less implying that the 
government is not otherwise heavily implicated in the market and economics as a 
whole. Keynesian economics is not exactly a critique of markets, but rather an 
economic fix to repair markets when they are in trouble. It is important not to get 
side-tracked by the sturm und drang of the economists’ intense debate.  In other 
words, Keynes is more of a corrective rather than a direct critique of markets even 
though government intervention does parallel some critiques. But those more 
critical positions go further to say that the government is there through thick and 
thin, not just as a tool of intervention. In other words, the government being there 
is not just to suddenly increase spending, but to also set the ground rules of 
markets functioning at all (not unlike Marx’s social relations of production).  
There are many other dissatisfactions concerning the more specific aspects 
of neo-classical views of markets, but these three issues – inequality, externalities 
and crises – are the major problems that social scientists see. The next sections 
represent various social scientific challenges to markets, and their specific 
dissatisfactions with markets.  
Unfair Exchange and the Labor Theory of Value 
Karl Marx was generally anti-market in the sense that he theorized that values in 
markets represented both exchange value and use-value. Markets were highly 
problematic since they relied on exchange values that were determined in ways 
that benefitted the owner classes at the expense of the working class. The working 
classes would prefer to have their needs met by products and food based on “use-
value,” but the capitalist system would not provide prices for goods and food at 
this level. Instead they relied on “exchange values” that are determined by the 
demand and supply.16 As such, the system was unjust and embodies much 
exploitation. His market-based solution (as opposed to his political solution of 
revolution) relied on the labor theory of value to switch the tables on the owners 
of capital to say that their extraction of surplus value should not be allowed 
because it should be justly distributed to the workers themselves. In fact, the labor 
theory of value states that all value is produced by labor and thus belongs to labor. 
This revamping or destruction of markets would be ruled by the principle of 
“from each according to their ability to each according to their need.” This 
solution largely calls for the destruction or withering away of markets. I will 
return to Marx later in this paper on the topic of crises. The next challenges to 
                                                            
16 Marx’s concepts of use value and exchange value (1992) parallel Adam Smith’s concepts of 
natural and market prices (1976, chapter 4). It is useful to note that both Adam Smith and David 
Ricardo espoused a labor theory of value, but unlike Marx they included managers and owners in 
their concept of labor.  
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markets focus on keeping markets, but controlling their harsh logics of 
exploitation.  
Embeddedness and the Fragility of Free Markets 
Karl Polanyi developed a theory of markets in the mid-1940s based on his 
historical examination of markets in Britain during the industrial revolution and 
beyond. He is referred to in a variety of ways as an economic historian, economic 
anthropologist, political economist, historical sociologist and social philosopher. 
In The Great Transformation, Polanyi argues that “there is nothing natural about 
laissez-faire”,17 and that free markets only existed in Britain for a very short 
period of time (roughly 1852 to 1873 after the repeal of the Corn Laws went into 
effect). However, when totally free markets held sway, they proved to be so 
disruptive and unworkable that the British economy needed to be substantially 
controlled by the state and sometimes civil society. Societies need the economy to 
be embedded into society and culture through various types of changes in social 
mores, institutional structures, and state regulation. After this was done, the 
British state stabilized the economy’s unfettered markets, and despite crises of 
financial panics, recessions and depressions, generally moved in a more and more 
prosperous direction. But Polanyi did not recommend this roly-poly and often 
exploitative survival mechanism. He was often seen as providing a foundation for 
an economic democracy movement that have particular resonance in the Social 
Democratic Party in Germany and various social movements.  
Polanyi is now seen as one of the major theorists of the economy being 
‘embedded’ in society and the institutional structuring of markets and society in 
general. His approach has largely led to the rise of economic sociology and 
anthropology that emphasizes alternatives to free markets. Polanyi went on to 
apply these principles to ancient economies such as Pre-Columbian America and 
ancient Mesopotamia, although its utility to the study of ancient societies in 
general has been questioned.  He goes back to Greek philosophy of Aristotle to 
make the distinction between chrematistics and oikonomia. Chrematistics is the 
production of goods or services for the purposes of creating wealth to enhance 
one’s own status and power in society. Oikonomia is producing goods and 
services to create wealth that serves the needs of society and distributive justice. 
This parallels Marx’s concepts of exchange and use value.18 It is odd that modern 
day economics and Wall Street looks to chrematistics more than Oikonomia.19 He 
then indicates that no action is purely economic since it is a Lebensweg (way of 
                                                            
17 Karl Polanyi and Harry W. Pearson. Livelihood of Man (Waltham, MA: Academic Press, 1977), 
139. 
18 Karl Marx, "Capital, Volume III" (Harmondsworth: Penguin/New Left Review, 1992). 
19 Matthew Watson, Foundations of International Political Economy (New York: Palgrave-
MacMillan, 2005), 28-29. 
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life) whereby humans lead a morally-guided way of life. Hence, “no action can be 
purely economic”.20 And when they are treated as such, we have reached an 
artificiality of economistic reification.  
Polanyi’s theories eventually became the foundation for anthropological, 
political and sociological schools looking at controls for the market and the 
economic democracy movement. I have not covered his mechanisms of exchange 
in this section, but will return to Polanyi in the section on decision-making below. 
An organization furthering his views exists at McGill University in Montreal. 
Fred Block and Margaret Somers, and Richard Swedberg are scholars now 
working in this tradition.21 A version of this embeddedness approach is taken by 
social network analysis, which shows how specific connections between people 
and organizations combine to make different types of decisions in markets. In a 
sense, the invisible hand is a fiction as these kinds of economic decisions are 
made through social networks of decision-makers in highly embedded institutions 
that cannot operate with a sense of automaticity. These social network approaches 
can be seen with the work of Harrison White, Ronald Burt, Mark Granovetter, and 
many others.22  
Organizational Conceptions of Control of Markets 
Economic sociologists and geographers have frequently insisted that markets are 
controlled by firms and elites, which also have strong influence on the state. 
These firms and elites represent market lumpiness with a bounded organization 
that can protect segments of managers and employees from supply and demand. 
In Neil Fligstein’s approach to markets has developed in an institutional way 
somewhat similar to Polanyi but more specifically focused on what corporations 
do and how corporations can persuade governments and ultimately societies to 
view market mechanisms. This presents firm action in coalitions in a more active 
and instrumental way than typically endorsed by market theorists. In The 
                                                            
20 Ibid.  
Karl Polanyi and Harry W. Pearson, Livelihood of Man, 1977. 
21 Fred Block and Margaret R. Somers, The Power of Market Fundamentalism (Boston, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2014). 
Richard Swedberg, Principles of Economic Sociology, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2007). 
22 Harrison White, Markets from Networks: Socioeconomic Models of Production (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2002). 
Roland Burt, Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition (Boston, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1995). 
Mark Granovetter, "Business Groups," The Handbook of Economic Sociology, eds. Neil Smelser 
and Richard Swedberg. (New York: Russell Sage, 1994). 
——— "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness," American 
Journal of Sociology 91, no. 3 (1985): 481-510. 
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Architecture of Markets and other works, Fligstein examines how corporations 
view market strategies in order to increase their power or survive in fluctuating 
circumstances. Fligstein and McAdams recent book extends this approach to 
Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of fields.23 
One focus of his approach is to look at how stakeholder value theories had 
emerged in the 1950s and 1960s with a focus on all of the people affected by 
corporations deserved a hearing in how corporate power was used. For instance, 
customers, workers, shareholders, communities, governments, and the public in 
general, and other constituencies have a ‘stake’ in corporate actions. Fligstein is 
not presenting a normative view that stakeholder value theory was correct, but 
rather looks at how corporations and capitalists renegotiated their “conception of 
control” of how the market would operate.  
Much of this renegotiation occurred during the oil crisis when Jimmy 
Carter was US president in the late 1970s, and corporate profits had gone into a 
nose dive due to the oil crises and youth rebellion, but even more threatening was 
the Nixon and Carter discussions of wage and price controls during highly 
inflationary times. Since the corporations still had considerable power, the 
negotiation was rather implicit until the final product later presented itself to these 
various groups. The solution aided by principal-agent theory in economics saw 
these larger social movements as a “stake” in the heart of capitalism, so they 
created a new theory based on a more focused agenda.  Corporations and their 
CEOs were agents of stockholders and they needed to be doing what shareholders 
wanted – make large profits.  
As a result, corporations changed their focus to “shareholder value theory” 
with considerable outsourcing and then off-shoring. They focused on keeping 
their nose to the grindstone of higher profits, increasing the price of their stock on 
Wall Street, and paying dividends to stockholders. This approach rewarded CEOs 
with higher wages and stock options in order to align CEO decisions with 
shareholder’s interests in their economic returns. The side effect of this was to 
increase corporate salaries to astronomical levels and largely decrease worker 
wages through outsourcing. The logic of outsourcing was to have work done by 
corporations with subcontractors who would not share in the good fortune of 
corporate profits. The overall theory based on this shift from stakeholder 
approaches to shareholder value theory is that firms socially construct the shape 
and functioning of markets through this conception of control. These conceptions 
may change over time and need to be examined by scholars. One under-
recognized aspect of stockholder value theory is that atomistic markets making 
decisions on their own do not really exist. Instead, large and bulky players, such 
as corporations and stock market exchanges shape and control markets. Compared 
                                                            
23 Neil Fligstein and Doug McAdam, A Theory of Fields (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2014). 
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to Polanyi who focused more on state institutions, Fligstein is adding an elite 
control theory into the mix negotiated by private firms and investment bankers.  
Actual Mechanisms of Markets: Sociological and Anthropological Views 
Embeddedness is a more contextual theory with little presence of a mechanism, 
and the conception of control provides some aspects of mechanism but not one 
that really talks about how markets actually work on a daily basis. A fourth 
approach combines a sociological view of decision-making using Max Weber’s 
theory of social action with its counterbalancing influence of culture, with a more 
specific anthropological view based on complex forms of exchange relying on the 
economist Amartya Sen and anthropologist Edward Fisher’s approach to prices, 
quality, and the environment. The following discussion will take Weber first, and 
then go to Sen and Fischer. 
Max Weber accepted much of the political economy approach of Karl 
Marx in terms of class but largely rejected his view of markets.24 His later work 
focused much more on the culture of the rise of capitalism with the Protestant 
Ethic. If we only relied on the cultural argument, we would be simply adding to 
Polanyi’s approach. But what is of more interest is his general theory of social 
action. Weber viewed social action as being based on four types of rationality, 
tradition and emotion. Weber interrogates rationality to find procedural, practical, 
theoretical and substantive rationalities. Herbert Simon as a neo-Weberian 
considerably softened rationality with satisficing under conditions of limited 
decision-making powers. Weber’s practical rationality was the application of 
these principles to the level of practical life where Simon’s more limited searches 
may apply. But in a different way, Weber also presented theoretical and 
substantive rationality. For instance, Pope Francis largely follows the theoretical 
rationality of the Catholic Church’s principles about the economy in caring for the 
poor and not producing so many poor people in the first place. This is based on a 
certain element of sharing and to some degree caring for a community. There are 
many elements to the theory of Catholicism, but those having to do with 
economic equality are more important than profit maximization. There are many 
other secular forms of theoretical rationality involved with political party 
ideologies, environmental movements, and cosmopolitan value theories. Social 
democratic parties do not follow market maximization principles and have a 
social market theory that embraces caring for the less fortunate in society. And 
substantive rationality may have less of a grand theory, but it is more or less the 
theory of fitting into the culture of your community in whatever way you might 
conceive of it.  
                                                            
24 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, New ed. 2 vols. 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978). 
Challenging Dominant Market Theories 52 
Culture makes its more direct entry into decision-making with “tradition” 
as a basis of social action. People do things the way they have done them in the 
past. To neo-classical economists, this makes people economic dopes because 
they are being irrational. But building on Herbert Simon’s theory of decision-
making overload, we cannot spend time everyday evaluating the procedural 
rationality of every action we take (e.g., is brushing your teeth rational and if it is 
should you brush five times a day to prevent tooth decay). We all largely live in 
fairly large entities called societies (admittedly the boundaries and belonging may 
be contested) that give us designs for living that we do not need to contest every 
day with maximizing logic. Many of these actions involve emotion, and families 
and communities involve a certain amount of love and caring. And interactions 
within and without may also involve hate and mistrust, but these emotions also 
bind us to traditions of various sorts of culture. But most cultures are constructed 
to create a certain amount of well-being for their members. Economists largely 
ignore religions that largely promote the well-being of their members and more 
secular or even cosmopolitan concerns for the well-being for outsiders. 
Within economics, there are infrequent mentions of emotions with Keynes 
concept of “animal spirits.” Though neoclassical economics have not taken up the 
concept of emotions and the field of economics in general avoids it, George 
Akerlof and Robert Schiller refer to animal spirits as the “noneconomic and 
irrational” aspects of social life that propel markets.25 These two Nobel Prize 
winners present five types of animal spirits or emotional aspects of economic 
action. The first is confidence by investors or consumers that provide the ups and 
downs of markets. Confidence can be very unstable and unpredictable, and it is 
prone to the “irrational exuberance” of a rising bull market to the almost 
“paranoid gloom” of bear market crashes.26 Rather than listening to economics, 
market commentators and prognosticators ride on the emotional confidence of 
investors in supporting a rising market or consumer confidence causing a rise in 
sales and a resulting surge in stock prices. A second type of animal spirit is 
fairness, which is mostly dominated by efficiency in the economics literature. But 
when the economist Albert Rees was dealing with administrative problems in his 
many different posts, he had to deal with “fairness” conceptions and beliefs of 
many groups.27 And labor (not to mention sociology, anthropology, psychology, 
and geography) in general constantly brings up fairness as a major concern that 
negotiating groups have concerning wages and working conditions.   
A third aspect of animal spirits concerns corruption, immorality, or 
                                                            
25 George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller, Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the 
Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism (Princeton University Press, 2010), 
xxiv. 
26 Robert J. Schiller, Irrational Exuberance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
27 George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller, Animal Spirits, 2010. 
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cheating in general. Akerlof and Schiller28 point to the many manipulations that 
market investors and firms may engage in ranging from outright scams of many 
Ponzi schemes that never really intend to be money making ventures to the actual 
murder and thuggery of gangster capitalism present in the new markets in Russia 
and elsewhere. Neoclassical economists sometimes view this as opportunism, but 
much of it slides from the grey areas of legal interpretations into blatant robbery, 
murder and “offers one cannot refuse.” And an opposite force sometimes comes 
to meet this is immorality with religion sometimes backed up by laws to the 
extent that they can be seen as legitimate and enforceable.  A fourth type of 
animal spirits is “money illusion” which is more of a cognitive issue.  This is 
when decisions over time are affected by nominal money values rather than the 
real wages or costs of goods and services.29 One can see this in long-term 
contracts that focus on current rates and ignore longer term costs over time.  All 
contracts should have cost-of-living adjustments and we should live in a world of 
adjustments based on real income; however, this is rarely the case. Offering the 
nominal amount of money in the short-term bargains reigns supreme as people 
don’t make real money adjustments.   
Finally, Akerlof and Shiller refer to story-telling or narrativity, which is 
the clever and skillful packaging of bundles of emotions into plots with some 
twists that capture people’s imaginations and believable explanations of events, 
both in the past but more importantly about what will happen in the future.30 
Regression equations are the stock and trade of economists, but they make lousy 
stories. In order to move people’s emotions, they need a more compelling tale 
with elements of the previous discussion – confidence, fairness, immorality, and 
illusion – in order to motivate them will some sort of orchestrated effervescence 
of emotions. Needless to say, this is not in the stock and trade of econometrics. 
Akerlof and Shiller do not plum the depth of human emotion, but as economists 
they uniquely point to many emotions that are directly involved in market 
processes. But their turn to ‘animal spirits’ only came about in the face of a major 
crisis and they are still ignored by most neo-classical economists.31 
Beyond emotions and tradition, Weber did have an overriding concern 
with one type of rationality that promotes maximization and also human suffering 
-- bureaucracy, the rise of capitalism, and even science with new discoveries. 
Doesn’t this mean that the machine of rationality is taking over society? While 
                                                            
28 Robert J. Schiller, Irrational Exuberance (2010), 26-30. 
29 George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller, Animal Spirits (2010), 41.  
30 Ibid., 51-58. 
31 The exception to the overlooking of values is the more cognitively focused behavioral 
economics that focuses especially on cognitive anchoring, fairness and money illusion (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 2000, Kahneman 2013). However, their often clever experiments do not question 
markets but rather try to add their accuracy. Nonetheless, they do include some issues related to 
emotions. 
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Weber was very troubled by this vision of an “iron-cage” of rationality, neo-
classical economists should not take heart that Weber is supporting them because 
in fact he is criticizing their world view. In order get our humanity back, we have 
to rebalance our decision-making to embrace theoretical rationality based on more 
fundamental values than unfettered growth, and cultural values of well-
functioning traditions and positive human emotions. While this may be putting 
words in Weber’s mouth, he in effect is saying “neo-classical economist, heal 
thyself.”  
Amartya Sen and Edward Fischer take Weber’s theory a bit further in 
terms of markets. The first step is that economic decisions are not only made 
about prices and profits, but they are also made concerning quality of the product 
(implying quality of life) and the values that these products tend to create. One 
may make economic decisions based on the price of the product, the quality of the 
product, and the values or justice that they engender to an increasingly global 
community. Fischer argues that the order of these components of decision-making 
may be reversed with the values coming first, the quality coming second, and the 
prices coming last. This is certainly turning this decision-making process on its 
head.  
Fischer gives the examples of buying eggs in Germany and fair trade 
coffee from Guatemala. In highly industrialized Germany, eggs are graded into 
four categories: organic and free range, free-range, cage-free, and caged.  To the 
human eye, the eggs largely look alike. In Hannover 60% of consumers buy the 
organic or free-range eggs at 4 to 5 times the cost, and in Germany as a whole, 
30% of people buy the same product. Why would maximizing rational people 
spend more on something when the product is not larger or does not particularly 
taste any different? The reason is that the decisions are based on values that 
indicate that chickens should be treated in a less horrid way than caged birds 
given artificial growth hormones. Another reason is that these people belong to 
communities (religious, political, or otherwise) that hold each other to social 
norms that constrain their actions (social pressures may exist that make one less 
respected if they are seen buying caged eggs). A similar logic applies to human 
producers. Why would people buy ‘fair trade’ coffee from Guatemala when it 
costs 30% to 60% more than free market coffee. A first reason is that they are 
expressing values that Guatemalan coffee growers should be able to make a 
decent living growing their crops and not be subject to dictates of demand and 
supply in a world market. The domestic living-wage movement expresses a 
similar concern. A more social reason may be that they support the family and 
community values of Guatemalan communities and don’t want to see them 
supplanted by profit-seeking corporate values. Emotions and theoretical 
rationality are involved with these decisions such as doing the right thing or 
seeking solidarity with others.  
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This then returns to Karl Polanyi’s discussion of the forms of exchange 
that put a little bit more interactional meat on Weber’s decision-making bones. 
Polanyi sees labor in social interaction as being based on four principles: 
reciprocity, competition, joy of work, and social approbation or social pressure.32 
Markets are mostly involved with competition to get the lowest price or highest 
quality for the price, but reciprocity, working for craftsmanship, and social 
pressure put the transaction into a complex social web where people know each 
other and have to respect the ebb and flow of their own ties to others. Much of 
Polanyi’s work is based on the anthropological work of Bronislaw Malinowski, 
Raymond Firth, and Richard Thurnwald.33 In my own work, I develop this in 
terms of restricted exchange between strangers or competitors and generalized 
exchange between friends and within families.34 Generalized exchange can be 
further put forth as bonding social capital or exchanges that take place for the 
benefit of the neighborhood, kin group, or for the community in general. 
Exchange theory has developed these concepts even further with experimental 
research.35  
Economists may argue that this may be a limited market segment of world 
production. But beyond reciprocity within families and communities, one finds 
that more affluent citizens may make these more moral decisions where values 
predominate over profit, and in the advanced industrialized world, there are many 
people who can afford to make these decisions. Fischer argues that there are more 
of them in Germany than in many other advanced industrialized countries. And 
other institutions such as worker representation on corporate boards, works 
councils elected by workers within firms, and strong welfare states accompany 
these Polanyian type institutions. While economists may argue that people will 
not make these decisions if they are poor, what explains affluent investment 
bankers in pursuing maximum profits just for their reputation as a player on the 
street? Using Polanyi, these chrematistic processes (sometimes called ‘pissing 
matches’ in the vernacular) involve people who are affluent and could certainly 
afford to consider buying expensive eggs and fair trade coffee. What kind of 
rationality keeps them in what often becomes an exploitative game of maximizing 
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profits for a life style that they hardly need? What kind of culture breeds this kind 
of behavior, where in the end, money does not buy happiness but rather simply 
increments in a rather dubious reputation.36 
But there is another element that may not involve affluence but rather 
destruction. The environmental issue of global warming threatens the planet 
according to most natural scientists. Can the world restrain the short-term focus of 
global capitalism in order to take a long-term agenda to save the planet? The 
emotion here is long-term fear rather than feeling good in helping poor people in 
another country. Where is the self-correcting market mechanism within capitalism 
to counter this problem? Some consumers may make similar decisions to buy 
hybrid cars, avoid coal-based energy production, and limit carbon dioxide 
production. The issue here is not so much affluence allowing it, but is rather the 
long-term survival of society. Jared Diamond in his book on how societies decide 
to collapse or adapt made the argument that Norse farmers who colonized 
Greenland produced and ate dairy cattle until they could not produce enough, but 
refused to catch and eat the abundant fish in the nearby ocean.37 Looking at this 
from afar we might ridicule the beef maximizing culture as short-sighted and even 
ridiculous. Will people in the future look at our high energy consuming culture 
based on oil and coal in the same way? 
Bargaining Power Mechanisms in Markets: 
Going back to the world of competing strangers, market theory needs a more 
ubiquitous mechanism for market behavior that does not have to rely on economic 
equilibrium. This can be found in a micro-interactionist theory called social 
exchange theory. Karen Cook and Eric Rice (2001: 715) indicate that a “marriage 
of exchange theory and economic sociology” is “promising.” This approach 
establishes a basic market mechanism that shows that nearly all market 
transactions are negotiated in terms of unequal power. Social exchange theory is a 
modified product of rational choice theory. It was started with George Homans 
and Peter Blau, but found its most important developments with Richard Emerson 
and Karen Cook.38 They developed the basic idea that power is based on 
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dependence.  
More specifically the power of Albert is based on Jim’s dependence on 
Albert, and Jim’s power is based on Albert’s dependence on Jim. And the overall 
power relationship can be based on comparing these two dependencies. 
Dependence itself is based on having fewer alternatives than other people, and 
these alternatives are based on the probability of success in obtaining resources 
that you value. While they use many equations to express this, the more or less 
bottom line is that a powerful person has more valued alternatives of a relatively 
high probability of success than a less powerful person who has fewer alternatives 
and lower probabilities of success. This gets elaborated with formal equations: 
1. PAlbert = 1 / Alternatives of Jim   
2. PJim = 1 / Alternatives of Albert  
3. Net Power of Albert = PAlbert - PJim 
The inequality of bargaining power is laid out in figure 1 where everyone does not 
have the same power. High income people have many more alternatives than low 
income people because they control more resources.39 This theory is made more 
realistic with the application of expected value to the relationship. Alternatives 
have a probability of occurring and they have a certain outcome in terms of 
value.40 So any alternative can be evaluated by multiplying the probability of its 
occurrence times the value of the outcome (i.e., an expected value). So one’s 
overall power situation is the sum of their alternatives weighted by their 
probability and values. It is clear that higher income people have higher 
probabilities of gaining higher value outcomes than lower income people.  
This micro-logic was pushed further into the macro-world by Samuel 
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Bacharach and Edward Lawler in two books about bargaining in organizations 
and nation-states.41 A simple example might be that a broker who has many 
houses to sell has more alternatives than a buyer who may have looked at only a 
few houses. Dependence may be further exacerbated by the buyer “has to have 
this house” since it is close to relatives, a local park, or their work. The most 
frequent example is the unfair bargaining position of an individual employee 
seeking work from a large corporation. Under conditions of high unemployment 
the worker has little power since the firm has so many alternatives.  
This type of theory is then plugged into every market exchange with the 
recognition that both restricted and generalized exchanges may occur (as 
discussed in the previous section). The power relationships are then as follows for 
high income person and a low income person. 
Σ Alternatives high  (Phigh * Vhigh)  >  Σ Alternatives low  (Plow * 
Vlow) 
In figure 2, these bargaining power relationships are diagrammed. Given that the 
alternatives’ values and probabilities are equal, the high income person has twice 
as much bargaining power than the low income person. In figure 2, the situation 
of an employer who has many choices and an employee who has only one is 
portrayed. 
Σ Alternativesc  (Pc * Vc)  >  Σ Alternativese (Pe * Ve) 
In this case, the corporation (c) has five times the bargaining power of the 
employee (e) given that the alternatives are of equal value. And when more 
information is available on the alternatives’ probability and value, the bargaining 
power differences are even more accurate.42  
While there may be a few market exchanges where bargaining power is 
equal, the vast majority of exchanges are conducted between the powerful and the 
less powerful and the very weak.43 For example, consider the mortgage officers 
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(who themselves are representing major investment and commercial banking 
interests) offer a low income couple entry into the housing market that they would 
not otherwise be able to afford (a frequent occurrence before the collapse of the 
mortgage market and the 2008 Great Recession). The mortgage officer has many 
alternatives to using that money represented by the loan, but the low income 
couple now has a chance to buy a house which previously was only a dream. 
Their loan with relatively low payments comes with a balloon payment after 3 to 
5 years. Clearly, the mortgage banker has more bargaining power in this situation. 
There are two elements involved, one of which some economists have dealt with, 
and another that they have not. The first is information asymmetry. Joseph 
Stiglitz, George Ackerlof and others have worked on this principle which 
basically indicates that the bank knows more about this loan and the couple’s 
ability to pay than the low income couple knows. More specifically they know 
that it will be very difficult for the couple to make the balloon payment 3 or 5 
years. If the couple cannot make the payment, the bank takes back the house and 
sells it to someone else, and the young couple loses what they have paid into the 
house. But the second part of the bargaining mechanism is that the couple have 
few alternatives of any value, and the mortgage banker has many (at least until the 
housing market collapses on the widespread use of these kinds of predatory 
practices). 
The final step in this part of establishing a social mechanism of markets is 
the replacement of marginal utility with bargaining power in each market 
transaction. Marginal utility states that economic incentives to invest are ruled by 
the additional increment of exchange value (i.e., profits but it can also be revenue) 
that one may obtain by engaging in a transaction. Thus, when these increments of 
marginal utility are high enough, investment is encouraged, and when they are 
low or negative, investment is withdrawn. However, this theory is a little too 
simple. It is basically establishing that a decider has a need, much like 
functionalist theory. It tells you very little about the terms of the exchange. One 
could argue that the extent of the marginal utility influences ones desire to stay in 
the transaction and gain more in the bargain, but that would directly fly in the face 
of low income couple’s rather suboptimal bargains. Poor people do not get more 
in their bargains (see the “poor pay more” literature on inner city food stores). 
One could reverse the relationship and say that the more marginal utility that you 
place on a particular bargain, the weaker your bargaining position. However, this 
plays into a social dependence theory of bargaining power, a theory that marginal 
utility seeks to avoid. The marginalists see the automatic balancing of marginal 
utilities in a market as a rather smooth process, not one laden by dependencies 
and power relationships. However, the social bargaining power approach places 
the unequal bargaining power of the two parties at center stage as a replacement 
for the marginalist’s mechanism for market functioning. Thus, power dependency 
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constitutes a clear market mechanism of exchange at the micro-level.  
Market Failure and Economic Crisis 
At this point, I would like to return to Marx and others to discuss market failure. 
Within the economics literature, market failure has a very specific meaning. It 
refers to areas of life where markets do not work, and governments or other 
cooperative civil society organizations should step in to provide goods and 
services. In a sense, the market does not solve collective action problems, and the 
state or a civil societal community needs to step up and provide the collective 
good (e.g., roads, sewage systems, water supply, and even social welfare 
payments for those who are more or less discarded by the market). But outside 
economics, market failure most often refers to where the market is supposed to be 
doing its job, especially financial markets. Major recessions and depressions often 
connected to the banking and stock trading systems throw thousands and even 
sometimes millions of people out of work, bankrupt various corporations and 
governments, and cause a great deal of social havoc and suffering. This is the 
market failure that most non-economists are concerned about. 
Marx has had the harshest criticism of the capitalist market system. He 
said it as prone to failure as the business cycle deepens and crisis leads to great 
suffering along with exploitation. There are two major ways that Marx explains 
crisis. One is through the lower and lower wage payments that firms provide 
when competing in cutthroat markets.44 As workers receive lower wages, they 
cannot buy the products that they need and buy the goods that keep the capitalist 
system growing. Marx then tied this immiseration thesis with a theory of the 
declining rate of profit, which is much more oriented toward firms.45 This decline 
affects how organizations act and investors put their money, which are also 
declining since they get dividends and other revenue from stock purchases or 
lending money to firms. Marx was not totally clear about the declining rate of 
profit in the third volume of capital because he referred to it as “a tendency” 
rather than a clearly stated law. However, whatever the source, Marxian theory 
has always maintained that there is a strong sense of crisis attached to the 
capitalist system and that its most important parts emerge from the exploitation of 
workers. 
While crisis theories are quite useful when there is actually a crisis, when 
times are good for the economy, crisis theory fades from view. Despite and also 
because of exploitation, capitalist economies have had sustained periods of 
economic growth. Joseph Schumpeter has often linked this to the entrepreneurial 
approach of ‘creative destruction’ whereby industries grow through their own life 
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cycle, and as they decline, new industries based on recently developed 
technologies take their place.46 Consequently, although there is decline, it is 
always superseded by the growth of new products, technologies and firms 
employing large number of workers. Crises come about when there is a 
technological lull in producing new industries or when consumers or investors are 
hesitant to embrace new technologies.47 This leads to a more or less standard 
theory of business cycles from which recovery is lamentably slow but somewhat 
inevitable.48 
However, there are recessions and depressions that are more intense than 
others. They are so slow that the short-run business cycle seems to move into a 
long-run decline. And Keynes is famous for his dictum that “in the long-run, we 
are all dead.” This is where Hyman Minsky’s theory is particularly useful. He 
puts forward three stages or types of financing that affect stock markets, 
investment banks, and other investment venues: hedge, speculative and Ponzi 
finance.49 In hedge financing, investors are relatively conservative. They expect 
the cash flow from their loans or investments to be “more than sufficient” to meet 
their commitments in the future. In other words, prudent investment is hedged by 
dependable firms using their money and repaying it within an expected period of 
time. In speculative-financing, banks expect cash receipts to be less than their 
commitments in the static short-term, but they expect additional growth 
opportunities that will increase the value of their investments and their revenues 
in the dynamic medium-term. So compared to hedge-financing, they are taking a 
risk that economic growth will occur to pay for the somewhat risky bets they are 
taking. In Ponzi-financing stage, banks and financiers make investments where 
not only is the return of interest or repayments rather insecure, but their own 
investments are borrowed to make those loans. In a sense, they are taking a 
double risk. This process can fit well with a the political business cycle theory of 
Michaƚ Kalecki where ruling politicians can reinforce these processes or initiate 
them through inflationary spending.50  
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Cycles come about in moving from hedge financing to the other two 
stages. The banks or financiers increasingly expect to make a killing in a major 
growth industry. They are driven to these other two stages by three factors. First, 
hedge financing is generating low but steady profits. But they see other firms 
making more money. The success of others makes the hedge-fund firms’ low 
profits look like failure. As a result, investors may move from the hedge-fund 
bank to riskier banks, causing a diminution in capital of the hedge-fund firm. 
Second, these next steps are based on expectations of large profits, and a certain 
amount of greed enters into the picture as their investors are always looking for 
higher returns. These expectations of profits double back to reinforce the 
optimism that future transactions are a sure thing to score future profits. And 
third, once they enter the speculative stage and are not covering debts, they need 
to “double down” with more risk believing that a bigger gain in Ponzi finance will 
bail them out of their debt-burdened predicament.  
While the business cycle has ups and downs with product and industrial 
life cycles, financial cycles operate with their own logic to push financiers to 
more risky alternatives and sometimes disastrous consequences. Mainstream 
economic thought on business cycles include growth spurts (as with automobiles 
or computers) and a boom may last for a decade rather than the usual 3 or 4 years. 
Speculative and Ponzi financing will take off during these periods and it may be 
difficult to differentiate between legitimate growth, delusional expectations, and 
outright frauds (e.g., Bernard Madoff massive investment pyramid scheme). Once 
a sufficient percentage of banks and investors have reached the Ponzi finance 
stage, it is only a matter of time before the bubble bursts and the economy 
tumbles down in the stock market and then affecting nearly all firms and workers. 
Massive government intervention is then necessary to reflate the economy and get 
the labor force back to work. These periods are especially painful. Minsky’s point 
is that because of the pressures to move to more profits either through greed or 
through rear guard actions to keep ones investors in the face of other apparent 
profit makers, the cycle is largely inevitable. The severity of cycles will vary, but 
they will continue to appear. One of the major difficulties is to differentiate 
between “legitimate high growth in the future” and “bubbles” that are 
manufactured by what Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan referred to as 
“irrational exuberance,” which he warned about but then became subject to 
himself. A major problem of these latter two stages is that fraud or unwarranted 
exuberance need not be an actual pyramid scheme, but may simply be 
encouraging investors to pursue a good investment that everyone else will get in 
on. In the 2008 great recession it involved mortgage bankers encouraging 
customers with little bargaining power to take loans with balloon payments they 
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could never make. It involved investment banks and brokers encouraging clients 
to buy stocks or funds that they knew were “dogs” destined to decline.  
After such crises, there is a call for government or industry regulation. 
This tends to be short-lived in most cases, though the Glass-Steagal Act remained 
in effect from the 1930s to the 1990s. In the current crisis, the Dodd-Frank Law to 
curtail these problematic financial misdeeds garners immediate attention, but as 
time passes conservative governments backed by the financial industry whittle 
away at regulation with the argument that they are preventing economic growth, a 
goal that all politicians want in one way or another. As Carmen Reinhart and 
Kenneth Rogoff  say in their masterful study of eight centuries of major crises: 
“This time it is different.” 51 There are plenty of investors, firms, and banks that 
argue that we are on the edge of a major boom and that only a fool would not 
jump in. And so in actuality, the fools jump. 
Conclusion 
This article makes no claim about ranking or synthesizing these theories. These 
are the five main challenges to market rationality and efficiency that now exist in 
the social and behavioral sciences. Various parts of all of them could be 
synthesized into a larger theory, but that work remains to be done in future work. 
In this conclusion, I will indicate how these theories are compatible or 
contradictory, and what possibilities may exist about synthesizing them into a 
more comprehensive theory.  
These challenges are pitched at different levels. Polanyi points to the state 
as the constructor and regulator of markets that keep the system going. Fligstein 
points to the role of firms in using a ‘conception of control’ to come up with new 
ways of making markets function given the constraints that the state may impose. 
Weber, cultural sociologists, and economic anthropologists point to how decision-
making mechanisms may work together to combine rationality, tradition and 
emotions into different types of value configurations that may rank quality, justice 
and price in different sorts of ways. The bargaining power theory points to the 
precise inequalities that may be present in market relationships operating under 
competitive rationalities so that inequality is always created and recreated rather 
than whisked away by claims of efficiency. And with crises, Marx, Schumpeter, 
and Minsky point to the inevitability and actual mechanisms of predictable 
economic conflagrations. Polanyi and Marx are more macro than Schumpeter and 
Minsky on crisis. Fligstein operates more at the mezzo-level in his approach. And 
the cultural decision-making and bargaining theories point to a micro-approach 
that pinpoints mechanisms of inequality, but also of cultural constructions of 
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traditions that may balance efficiency and justice, or not.  
Each one of these challenges poses different sorts of power issues.52 First, 
labor markets mitigate against workers when there are few alternatives as during 
high unemployment. This is ‘marketplace bargaining power’ based on tight labor 
markets. Second, labor’s position in the production process can give workers 
‘workplace bargaining power’ with leverage over capitalists, resulting in the 
power to strike and raise wages or improve working conditions. Labor law has a 
lot to do with strengthening or weakening this power. Third, ‘associational power’ 
in terms of unions (UAW) or interest groups (NOW or the NAACP) can lead to 
coalitions and growing political power. And fourth, ‘informational power’ can 
come from open access to information and the evening of information (lessening 
of asymmetrical information) in bargaining situations. State regulatory power can 
have a lot to do with the power of corporations and other private firms. Future 
work would need to flesh out these powers in terms of policy, as this paper has 
focused on the theoretical challenges currently being faced by unruly markets. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to synthesize this into a more general 
theory. But social scientists are working in the fields of economic and cultural 
sociology, and economic anthropology to create a more complete theory of what 
we might call “social markets” for the future. The policy implications of this 
approach will definitely challenge the oft claimed queen of the social sciences – 
neo-classical economics. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure 1:   Bargaining Power between High and Low Income Persons 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Each alternative is evaluated according to its probability of success (Prob) 
and the value of the alternative (value). 
 
Figure 2:   Bargaining Power between a Corporation and a Worker 
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